From Beirut to the Beltway

Hizbullah always makes a big deal about its allegedly crucial role in securing electoral victory for Hariri and Jumblatt and the “March 14” parties in the 2005 parliamentary elections. Some have gone as far as suggesting that without such support, Hariri and Jumblatt are doomed to lose in future elections. This prediction is based on a false premise laden with assumptions. The first of these assumptions is that the electoral law will not change and the districting would continue to favor pro-Syrian parties. The second assumption is the belief that Hizbullah can survive without an alliance with Sunni and Druze parties in the country.

Al-Seyassah published an article recently claiming that Hizbullah went against Syria’s advice of forming an alliance with Michel Aoun during the election, opting instead to ally itself with Jumblatt and Hariri in Baabda-Aley, where a Hizbullah-Aoun ticket could have weakened the Jumblatt-backed list. Hizbullah reportedly followed Iranian advice to secure backing and legitimacy from an alliance with other Muslim parties in the country, so as not to appear as a lone Shia party running against the rest of the Muslims in the country. With the Sunni support, the party’s activities appear more legitimate in the eyes of Lebanese and, more importantly, other Sunnis in the region. I don’t think Ahmadinejad will or can push Hizbullah into abandoning this strategy. For the street-sweeper Iranian president himself is busy building pan-Islamic support by pandering to the Sunni-based anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiments in the region. Despite what Iran’s role in Iraq might imply, the Islamic republic and its Lebanon-based militia need the Sunnis to justify and support their anti-Israeli and anti-American policies.

For that I doubt that Hizbullah can continue suppressing its Lebanese dimension without incurring serious political damage. Jumblatt and more importantly Saad Hariri, realizing that Hizbullah is constantly using their political alliance against them, have now asked Nasrallah to make a choice between Lebanon and Syria. This means Hizbullah can no longer obstruct cabinet decisions and aid the Syrian destabilization campaign by playing the “consensus” card.

Hizbullah now is more isolated than ever. It can no longer hope to cow the majority through intimidation and escalation of the Shebaa front. Any unilateral attack on Israel will now be widely condemned in Lebanon. With the Syrian regime bombing campaign in high gear, Hizbullah can no longer convincingly justify its support for a regime that wants to kill and terrorize Lebanese people. Through their increasingly vocal anti-Syrian stances, Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt have created a treason cloud over Hizbullah. Walid Jumblatt is now openly calling on it to Lebanonize itself and its weapons. Marwan Hamade on Sunday said any military escalation in the south would be seen as a part of the Syrian attempt to destabilize the country.

The “Party of God” can turn to Aoun, but I am not sure how far Aoun can go with it without alienating his base and further angering the US, France and Saudi Arabia. A long-term FPM-Hizbullah alliance is unmanageable, and in any case, Hizbullah cannot hope to manipulate it much. Strategically, I think Jumblatt and Hariri are better natural allies for Hizbullah, something the party’s leadership knows very well.

Khaddam’s recent defection has strengthened the Hariri-Jumblatt camp. His endorsement of the Hariri investigation will weaken Hizbullah’s argument against an international tribunal. I expect it to also put a strain on the Hizbullah-Amal “alliance”, if one can call it that. I do not want to be in Nabih Berri’s shoes right now. I think we will see further efforts by the parliament speaker to resolve the cabinet crisis. After’s Khaddam’s accusations, Berri should be praying for a way to send his ministers back into the cabinet without suffering political decapitation at the hands of Hassan Nasrallah. His membership in Bashar’s Lebanese circle is at best opportunistic and pragmatic. It remains to be seen how much longer he can pretend to be a “Basharite” in order to save himself from political irrelevance. I think Berri should seize this historic opportunity to lead some of the Shia away from Syria’s “lap”, and back into secular/sectarian politics (as opposed to religious).

Khaddam’s defection made it clear that to the Syrian regime, eliminating Hariri was domestic policy, part of Bashar’s coming of age as a dictator. After all, to the Assad family, Lebanon is a province and not a separate country. Some reports suggest that Khaddam coordinated his bombshell with other figures some of whom are still in Syria. We could very well see a similar surprise from former Syrian army chief of staff Hikmat al-Shihabi. It is hard to tell at this point how this is really playing in Syria. Ammar Abdulhamid downplayed its effect on the Syrian regime. Anton Effendi saw it as an indication of a power struggle over Lebanon between Damascus and Saudi Arabia, among other things. Regardless, the effect on local Lebanese politics is empowerment of the fractured anti-Syrian camp, which, and for the first time since Hariri’s assassination, is finally putting pressure on Syria’s most prominent ally, Hizbullah.

With the US reportedly moving to propose a resolution specifically condemning it, Hizbulllah has two options: work it out with Hariri and Jumblatt, or go to war. Stonewalling is no longer allowed.