From Beirut to the Beltway

My post comparing Hizbullah to the Basij militia sparked a lively debate at the Future Movement political forum (hat tip Khaled). It stirred up a range of issues from the representational power of Hizbullah to its status as a Lebanese political party that should command respect. In a comment to my Naharnet post, fellow blogger Anton Efendi also posted a long article from al-Seyassah claiming fissures within Hizbullah's ranks. The article depicted an internal Iranian tug of war over who will succeed Nasrallah as secretary general, with the latter allegedly belonging to former President Rafsanjani's current and lacking the hardline qualities Ahmadinejad requires in his leaders. Raja on Lebanese bloggers went as far as raising the possibility of military conflict within Hizbullah similar to what happened in 1998 when former secretary general Subhi al-Tufeili led a failed revolt against Nasrallah along with 200 of his supporters.

Beginning with the debate at the FM forum, my critics are right in that Hizbullah is more than Basij, and for the record I didn't say Hizbullah's organizational structure was modelled after the Iranian militia. My analogy served to show that Lebanon cannot copy the Iranian model by delegating matters of defense to a paramilitary group, like Iran does.

What is Hizbullah?

One of my critics rejected calling Hizbullah a militia. "Hizbullah is a political party with a military wing fighting against occupation," he said. That's a false characterisation. Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh in "In the Path of Hizbullah" defined Hizbullah as a "jihad movement that engages in politics, and not a political party that engages in jihad." It is "an Islamic political party but neither its leadership or its organizational structure is equivalent to conventional secular parties such as those in the western democratic or socialist system."

Hizbullah does not believe in democracy, be it western or Lebanese. It also doesn't believe in and engages in "jihad" against the following concepts: nationalism, socialism, liberalism and women's rights. These are concepts it considers alien to Islam. In many ways, it is a mini-Iran with authority and control concentrated in a seven-member Shura council. The highest authority in Hizbullah's world is the Wali al-Faqih, Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. It's not the Lebanese cabinet, and certainly not the president. The party’s representatives in parliament and in the cabinet answer to the Shura council and act according to its instructions. Nasrallah is quoted in Hamzeh’s book as saying that ”being a member in parliament does not mean that Hizbullah’s elected representatives are above the authority of the Shura council.”
In other words, the party and its members are completely and directly under the control of its clerical leadership, which answers and is "guided" by the supreme leader of Iran.

It follows from the above that the Party of God represents only its interests and those of the Iranian clergy. This reduces Hizbullah into an armed religious movement that engages in politics.

Representation

The votes that elected Hizbullah's MPs did not stem from real democratic choices. Many of the party's Shia followers did not partake in the vote out of democratic duty. They did it out of religious duty. Hizbullah's ideologically committed constituency voted under "Taklif sharii of the wilayat" (the religious commands of the Guardianship). There is no democracy involved here. Other Shia voters went to the polls to re-elect the only power that offers them social services, education and hospitalization. Again, this is not a democratic choice, this is a failure of a weakened state that failed to take care of its own.

You could argue that if that's how Hizbullah and their followers want it then by all means let them have it their way. It's not like other parties in Lebanon adopt democratic principles and hold primaries to open the door to competition within the party ranks. You could also argue that very few political parties in Lebanon or the rest of the world for that matter do not put their party loyalty first. That's a valid point if Hizbullah were a national party that wasn't funded by a different country and that didn't seek Jihad to establish some sort of Islamic Zion in Lebanon.

It is never fair to allow a religious entity to field candidates because its followers will vote like they're voting for God. And when that party is connected to a foreign entity, it makes allowing such a party to enter elections criminal if not an act of treason. Had Khamenei been a apolitical cleric, things would probably be different. But we're talking about Iran here, where religion and politics are one and the same.

That is why I believe Hizbullah, in its current shape and form, has no place in Lebanese politics. It is not freedom to let them field candidates who are going to win by virtue of being what the cleric and the doctor ordered. So next time you catch yourselves saying Hizabullah represents Shia through free elections remember how Hizbullah does not believe in that freedom you attach to their so called electoral victory. Does Iranian style Shia Islam represent Iranian style Shia? Yes. Does it mean anything when the cleric runs in an election and wins? No. Empowering religious men, let alone arming them, is a recipe for destruction.

Hizbullah and Ahmadinejad

According to Hamzeh, Hizbullah has been adopting a “gradualist-pragmatic” mode since the death of Khomeini and the election of Rafsanjani. The Rafsanjani-Khamenei combination was instrumental in pushing the party into the Lebanese political scene. In fact, it is said that Khamenei’s strategy has been to encourage Hizbullah to gain a foothold in the Lebanese political system. This was part of the party’s “political Jihad” as Hamzeh pointed out in his book, an “opportunity to seek power” by penetrating the parliament. For Hizbullah does not believe in western democracy, nor is the party a political party in the western or socialist sense as I mentioned above. Being in parliament is just part of that jihad stuff.

So does it make a difference that Iran has a new ultra-conservative president? Will this split Hizbullah into two camps or worse, harden its policies further? Logic leads us to believe that If Ahmadinejad gets his way with his Lebanese-based party, he will encourage the Hizbullah leadership to rely on the numerical strength of its constituents, who outnumber those of Amal, to consolidate power within the Shia community. Ahmadinejad’s style is to expedite the political jihad by purging moderates and spread a “Basij culture.” He wants to take on the world and is allegedly close to developing a nuclear bomb. With the Syrian masters gone, Hizbullah is no longer forced to compromise or strike electoral alliances with Amal. In that regard, Al-Seyassah's claim, which is that certain pro-Ahmadinejad Hizbullah MPs are already working on creating wide divisions in Amal's ranks in a bid to take over the party, seems plausible.

But would this have happened anyway given Hizbullah's course of jihad and the departure of Syria, which would have protected Berri and tried to weaken Hizbullah*? My guess is yes, eventually. In that sense, the worse Ahmadinejad can do is expedite the jihad. This should be a wake up call to those who still think a party like Hizbullah is a national party and not a time bomb about to explode in our faces. Whether or not the street sweeper of Tehran will overcome Khamenei's authority is not important anymore. Measures should be taken to limit the influence and political participation of entities that pose as Allah's own army.

I am not calling for its immediate elimination. We don't want civil war. The state must reclaim the people who live under Hizbullah's rule. And it must reclaim them by adopting national policies that accommodate all Lebanese sects so not to alienate or enrage other groups. It's not a "dialogue" we need; it's the vision and will to win Lebanese people back. The electoral laws should bar parties running in elections from receiving foreign aid, let alone carry arms. But most importantly, Hizbullah's Shia followers have to be won back. Hamzeh said it best in the conclusion of his book:

…the future course of Hizbullah will depend on the ability of the Lebanese state to accommodate both Muslim and Christian interests under the Ta’if formula, and to bring some measure of economic prosperity to all social classes, in particular the poor classes, regardless of sectarian affiliation.

*It is believed that the Syrians encouraged former Hizbullah secretary general Subhi al-Tufeili’s revolt in 1998 in order to weaken Hizbullah in Lebanon by splitting it into two parties, keeping one in the south to fight Israel, and another in the Beqaa under Tufeili and the Syrians [Hamzeh cites Norton, Hizbullah in Lebanon]. This failed, and my guess is that it was another Syrian gamble to make sure it has the upper hand in Lebanon, and not Iran, despite the Iranian-Syrian agreement in the 1990s.