From Beirut to the Beltway

Two days after the damning Mehlis report fingered Syrian intelligence, Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces (ISF) said they arrested three suspects who confessed to being asked by a “non Lebanese” security service to carry out “terrorist operations”.

“Prior to the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, and at the request of an officer from a non Lebanese security service, fugitive Hassan M. (33), ordered a number of people to commit terrorist operations in Lebanon,” said the ISF statement. The operations included throwing sound bombs and starting firefights in different areas in the Mount Lebanon and Beirut governorates. According to the statement, the intention was to “sow confusion and threaten civil peace.”

The three arrested individuals said they did not carry out their orders and confessed to being paid large sums by the go-between Hassan M, who was presumably working for Syrian intelligence.

On Friday, the Mehlis report tied the Hariri assassination to the campaign of bombings that rocked Lebanon over the past few months:

The 14 February explosion needs to be assessed clearly against the sequence of explosions which preceded and followed it, since there could be links between
some, if not all, of them.

Addendum. Al-Mustaqbal named Syrian intelligence official Jamea Jamea as the person who charged Hassan H. to recruit the bombers.

The paper adds that Judge Said Mirza has detained Mahmoud Abdel-Al to question him about his involvement in the Hariri assassination.

Jamea Jamea is an important figure in the UN investigation. He has been linked to Ahmad Abdel-al, of al-Ahbash. Abdel-Al was interviewed as a witness and later as a suspect by the UN team. Mahmoud Abdel-Al is Ahmad's brother. He is the person who placed the phone call to Lahoud's mobile phone minutes before the explosion. (Lahoud's spokesman argued on Friday that the number Abdel-Al called was one of many numbers in Lahoud's office, denying that Lahoud himself had talked to him).

Here are relevant excerpts from the Mehlis report:

[Ahmad Abdel-Al]'s telephone records reveal that at 1147 hrs, he had a telephone contact with a number which phoned his home telephone number a number of times immediately before the explosion --- 1226 hrs, 1246 hrs and 1247 hrs. While Abdel-Al told UNIIIC that he called home shortly after the explosion at 1256 hrs, telephone records show that the call was made at 1254 hrs, two minutes before the explosion. Abdel-Al stated, that he did not leave the Al-Ahbash office the day of the blast for security reasons. The telephone records showed four calls to Syrian intelligence officer Jamea Jamea, at 1142 hrs, 1814 hrs, 2023 hrs and 2026 hrs.

According to a witness, Abdel-Al visited Jamea Jamea’s office the evening of the blast at 19:30 in which the two discussed Abu Adass. Moreover, shortly after his visit to Jamea Jamea’s office, Abdel-Al’s mobile phone registered a call to Rustum
Ghazali, at 1956 hrs. Abdel-Al also sought to steer the investigation towards Abu Adass , not only by providing the Lebanese authorities with extensive information on Abu Adass shortly after the blast, but also stating to UNIIIC that the Al-Ahbash Security Service had seen Abu Adass before the assassination in the Ain Al-Hilweh Palestinian camp together with Abu Obeida the deputy leader of the terrorist group Asbat al Ansar.

There are also numerous contacts between Ahmad Abdel-Al and Lebanese State Security on the day of the blast. For example, Abdel-Al had almost daily telephone contact with Brigadier General Faysal Rasheed, Chief of State Security in Beirut and on 14 February 2005, they had telephone contact at 1035 hrs, 2008 hrs, 2113 hrs, 214 hrs and 2216 hrs. Ahmad Abdel-Al also had contact with suspect Raymond Azar, of the Lebanese Army, on 14 February 2005, as well as 16 and 17 February 2005. There was a call between the mobile phone of Albert Karam, another member of the Lebanese Army Intelligence, and Ahmad Abdel-Al on 14 February as well, at 1212 hrs, about 44 minutes before the blast.

Abdel-Al’s phone also had extensive telephone contacts with Mustafa Hamdan’s phone, as 97 calls occurred between the two between January and April 2005. Of these, four were made on 14 February 2005, after the explosion. Ahmad had two telephone contacts with his brother, Walid Abdel-Al, a member of the Republican Guard, the day of the blast at 16:15 and 17:29. In addition, Abdel-Al received a call on 11 February 2005 at 2217 hrs from the same telephone booth used to call Al-Jazeera shortly after the blast on the 14 February. He also received a call on the 4 February 2005 at 19:34 and on 26 February 2005 at 0933 hrs from the booth used
to call Reuters shortly after the blast.

Abdel-Al has been in frequent contact with Mahmoud Abdel-Al, his brother, who is also active in Al-Ahbash. Mahmoud Abdel-Al’s telephone calls on 14 February are also interesting: he made a call minutes before the blast, at 1247 hrs, to the mobile phone of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and at 1249 hrs had contact with Raymond Azar’s mobile telephone.

[Ahmad] Abdel-Al also has notable connections to a significant weapons store discovered in southern Beirut in July 2005. This weapons store was raided by the ISF on 26 July 2005 and five people, with close connections to the former Mourabitoun militia, were arrested. One of the arrestees was the driver and bodyguard of Majed Hamdan, Mustafa Hamdan’s brother, who runs a firm which reportedly provided security for the St. George hotelHotel. Abdel-Al reportedly arranged for another arrestee to be employed as an electrician in the presidential palace. Furthermore, immediately after the arrests, another individual fled and promptly telephoned Ahmad Abdel-Al.

The Lebanese judiciary is obviously beginning to act on the information submitted by Mehlis, a lot of which was not publicised so as not to undermine the investigation. (So those people who claim the Mehlis report is inconclusive and lacks hard evidence need to remember that the investigation is NOT finished).